

27 June 1968

BRIEFING NOTICE

INFO:

D/OSR; PA/OSR; OSR/RAD/SA; OD/OSR-4
PA/EURA FEA/China
PA/MEA FEA/IC-2
PA/FEA MEA/AR
PA/WHA MEA/Afr-2
OBI Graphics EURA/EE-2
SDO EURA/FII
EURA/Sov WHA/Panama

O/DCI [REDACTED] 25X1A
C/DDCI [REDACTED] 25X1A
Exec Dir
O/LC
DDI, O/DDI [REDACTED] 25X1A
DD/S&T--3
ODD/P [REDACTED] 25X1A
D/ONE D/OER

NOTE: IF UPDATING FURNISHED TO [REDACTED] WED. P.M. STILL STANDS, 25X1A
PHONE CALL TO THAT EFFECT FRIDAY MORNING WILL SUFFICE.

1. DCI will brief the joint CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees (the so-called Russell Subcommittee) for a scheduled 90 minutes at 10:30 Monday, 1 July.

2. Russell Subcommittee has not been briefed since 17 November, but the full Armed Services Committee, Senator Russell chairing, was briefed on 19 Jan, and the full Appropriations Committee, Senator Hayden chairing, on 20 Feb. Each of these was the basic year-end posture briefing on USSR and Communist China. (Sen. Stennis' Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee was briefed on 9 April in great detail on status of Soviet and Chinese offensive and defensive systems, but only a few of the Senators on the Russell Subcommittee were present. (All of these briefing texts avail inS/Pres for ref.)

3. Briefing will be wide open classification, standard NSC Briefing format, illustrated by VU-Graphs. DCI's party will include Legislative Counsel, D/OSR, SAVA, CS/Pres. Rehearsal at 10:30 Saturday, 29 June makes the deadline for contributions to CS/Pres 1400 Friday, 28 June at the latest. Deadline for completed VU-Graphs, in Watch Office by 0800 Monday morning, July 1. Updating preferably Sunday evening, also by 0800 Monday at latest.

4. Proposed agenda:

I. Soviet Military:

A. Soviet strategic missile status: as in 6/24 Mahon. (Need to update VU-graph on FOBS record with April/May test dates) (Suggest combine record chart with new schematic on FOBS, ICBM, DICBM trajectories) On [REDACTED] identify with SAVAGE, crank in range/warhead estimates if any. When was Savage first paraded?)

25X1B

B. Soviet Nuke Subs. Start with 6/24 [REDACTED] text, but build up operating patterns with a sentence or two to justify using map of ocean patrol areas. 25X1A

Add new IRBM/MRBM developments - scale board on Sino-Soviet frontier.

OSR

25X1A

- C. Soviet Defense: Reverse, combine and expand 6/24 [redacted] on ABM and Soviet Air Forces. Status of Moscow ABM sites, with enough text to run in photo of Galosh on erector (Vu-Graph on hand.) Tallinn count. (see (a) below) SA-3's in EE. Hangarettes. TU-114 Big Dish. New and developing fighters. (D/OSR to have specs, stax with him.) Point out Flogger experimental, might not be ultimate operationally deployed ac. DCI asked in regard to ABM, and in view of current Senatorial debate on Sentinel, ~~on how to move forward with the program~~ that you crank in pertinent and useful portions, including graphics, of TCS-1939, June 1968, Recent Developments in Moscow ABM system.) Assessment of Gromyko Speech

(With CCI/EURA?)

OSR

- (a) In view of current Senate debate of ABM/Sentinel question, and related renewed speculation on SA-5, DCI wants a back-up briefing paper he can use at this point to answer specifically: "Why SA-5?" Answer should not only point out continuing Soviet concern with over-all SAC manned bomber threat, but relate probable dates in Soviet decision and implementation process to their corresponding knowledge and probable assessment at those times of our B-58, B-70, Hounddog, SR-71, etc., programs. i.e., answer to question, ~~why xaxexsaxkexsxxx~~ If SA-5 is designed to meet aerodynamic threat, why such a large response to what at present is a relatively limited challenge?

OSR

- D. Soviet Space: Full committees got good year-end briefing, but need to be topped off on status and potential of TMTR J-1 and J-2, with good recent 25X1D [redacted] status of circumlunar effort, possibly with map of standard global ship deployment to support, and in connection with potential of future launcher, our estimates on various Soviet MOL possibilities.

25X1A

[redacted] thru
ADDI

- (a) DCI wants paper for use at this point summarizing --as in recent memo to SecDef--his position on US MOL, as well as memo itself in case he decides to read them full version.

OSR

II. Communist China

25X1D

25X1A

FEA/China

25X1D

- A. Status of Advanced Weapons Programs. Basically, 6/24. Add latest [redacted]
B. Status of Cultural Revolution. [redacted] 6/24, beefed up with any useful [redacted] on fighting, rail disruptions, etc. 25X1A
25X1D Could use [redacted] if FEA and OER consider is a valid guess, on extent of economic disruption 1967.

25X1A

MEA/AR III. Middle East: 2 6/24 [REDACTED] text with any necessary updating--ie., today's Black CIB [REDACTED] stuff 25X6
cranked in briefly. 25X1A

EUR IV. Berlin Access: 6/24 [REDACTED] updated as necessary.

EUR/FII V. France: Timing is awkward again. DCI probably would rather deal with signif. of elections for future, than review course of events or use present text on what approaches various political elements were using in campaign. (a) If we are fairly confident of significant gain by Gaullists, or similar gains/losses elsewhere, could lead piece with interpretation of what election results will mean, then leave space to insert actual second round returns Monday morning. For this audience, touch briefly on economic costs of disruption with emphasis on what it does to French nuclear program, speculation if available on what it will do to over-all military budgets in next couple of years.

25X1A

EUR/EE VI. Czechslovakia: Update 6/24 [REDACTED] without lengthening, or boil it down into terse whats-the-Czech-bit-all-about summary, adding note that in all these EE liberalization flare-ups, neither Sovs nor EE leaders will let them endanger basic and essential Sov-EE relationship. Touch on Sov troop participation in Warsaw Pact maneuvers. 25X1C

OSR B. What have we learned from [REDACTED] DCI and DDCI mentioned PDB piece, also recent study with good graphics on current Sov planning for first and second echelon advance into WEurope. i.e., emphasis on what useful info he has given us on Sov/Warsaw Pact strategic planning and strategic concepts. 25X1A

re preemptive

FEA/IC VII. Vietnam: DCI mentioned [REDACTED] study of what's been going on in DRV since 3/31, said he wanted to give "Short overview of what's going on"--What is DRV now doing by way of (1) repair and reconstruction (2) infiltration (3) logistics (probably including improved status of Ho Chi Minh trail, new roads in DMZ and SVN); briefly, what's mil siun on SVN, and finally, political siun SVN. (Excuse, siun is UP for sit or situation.)

FEA/IC VIII. Cambodia: [REDACTED] text 25X1A

WHA IX. Panama: [REDACTED] Text 25X1A

MEA/AF X. Nigeria: [REDACTED] Text 25X1A

XI. Rhodesia: Current status, results, prospects on sanctions. (couple of pages at outside--specify what latest [REDACTED] was.) 25X1A

25X1C

X7610 Red 9380 G 8357
Tube BZ-4

25X1C

Note to EURA/Sov Div: DCI is planning to use a DD/P "nugget" on [REDACTED] and in this connection mentioned a memo disseminated last week on what is bothering Soviet intellectuals--I gather in comparison to what the press thinks is bothering Soviet intellectuals. Can you provide me with a page or page and a half, preferably tying this in to [REDACTED] and with a copy of the memo itself?

25X1C

25X1A

(Page 4 to EURA/Sov, EURA/PA, [REDACTED] and Info addressees only)

-4-

XXX++

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